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AUSSCHREIBUNGSVERFAHREN FÜR ERGEBNISORIENTIERTE AGRAR-
UMWELTVERTRÄGE  
 
AUCTIONING OUTCOME-BASED CONSERVATION CONTRACTS  
 
Zusammenfassung 
In  diesem  Beitrag  werden  zwei  Vorschläge  zur  Verbesserung  der  Effizienz  von  Agrar-
Umweltprogrammen untersucht: Ergebnisorientierte Bezahlung und Allokation der Verträge 
per Ausschreibungsverfahren. Im Vordergrund steht eine Wirkungsanalyse der Kombination 
beider  Instrumente.  Die Analyse  beruht  auf  ökonomischen  Experimenten,  in  denen  unter 
kontrollierten Bedingungen der Anteil der ergebnisorientierten Zahlung an der Gesamtzahlung 
systematisch variiert wurde. Im Papier werden die Bedingungen herausgearbeitet, unter denen 
die Kombination beider Instrumente vorteilhaft erscheint.   
Schlüsselbegriffe:  Auktionen,  Ausschreibungsverfahren,  Agrar-Umweltverträge,  Agrar-
Umweltpolitik, Anreizverträge, experimentelle Ökonomie  
Abstract 
This paper explores two ideas to enhance the performance of agri-environmental contracting 
schemes: linking contract payments to environmental outcomes and putting the contracts up 
for tender. This paper investigates whether there are any gains to be had by combining the 
benefits  of  both  approaches.  Controlled  lab  experiments  were  run  in  two  countries, 
systematically varying the rate at which payments are linked to environmental outcomes. This 
paper clarifies the conditions under which the benefits from combining tenders with incentive 
payments outweigh the costs.   
Keywords:  Conservation  tenders,  auctions,  incentive  contracts,  agricultural  policy, 
environmental policy, market-based instruments, experimental economics   
1 Introduction 
In the last three decades, governments around the globe have developed market-based 
policy instruments to procure environmental services from private landholders. Conservation 
contracting  represents  the  most  commonly  used  policy  instrument  in  this  respect.  The 
increased  importance  of  environmental  contracting  has,  to  date,  hardly  been  reflected  in 
innovative  policy  design.  It  remains  the  norm  in  most  conservation  programs  to  offer  a 
uniform payment for compliance with a uniform set of management prescriptions. This paper 
sets  out  to  explore  two  proposals  that  have  been  made  to  enhance  the  effectiveness  of 
conservation contracting: linking contract payments to environmental outcomes (rather than 
management  prescriptions)  and  putting  the  contracts  up  for  tender  (rather  than  paying 
landholders uniform prices). Whereas the two aspects have been studied in isolation in the 
literature, the focus of the present paper is on exploring the combined effect of outcome-based 
payments  and  tendering  on  conservation  behavior  and  the  resultant  performance  of  agri-
environmental contracting. In the interest of clarity, we will however explore the two aspects 
consecutively.  We  will  first  investigate  the  impact  of  linking  payments  to  environmental 
outcomes in a non-tendered setting. Subsequently, we will study the additional impact on 
conservation  behavior  and  policy  performance  of  putting  such  incentive  contracts  up  for 
tender.  
Theoretical predictions are far from clear. Outcome-based payments harness the self-
interest of their recipients to act in the interest of the conservation agency by optimizing their 
stewardship effort. At the same time, they create previously absent risks for landowners, some   3 
or many of which are beyond their control. It can happen that, due to factors such as disease, 
pest invasions, fire, drought, or natural fluctuations in wildlife populations, the environmental 
outcome is much diminished or even nil – in spite of the fact that costly on-ground actions 
have been carried out. This is likely to reduce participation in the scheme and thereby its 
environmental effectiveness. There is thus a tradeoff to be studied between an incentive effect 
on the one hand and a participation effect on the other. If the latter outweighs the incentive 
effect, linking payments to uncertain outcomes is likely to be unproductive. 
The motivation for studying the impact of tendering lies with the property of auctions 
of  creating  competition  among  potential  providers  of  environmental  benefits.  Properly 
designed, auctions create scarcity amongst landholders in that the total payments on offer are 
set to be (much) less than the potential demand for them. Putting incentive contracts up for 
tender thus has the potential further to enhance the performance of conservation programs.  
The  present  paper  aims  to  further  current  knowledge  in  the  field  of  conservation 
contracting by clarifying key aspects of tendering contracts with payments linked to uncertain 
outcomes. In order to examine the effect of the two opposing forces, the incentive effect and 
the participation effect, we shall study several points on the continuum between no payments 
linked to uncertain outcomes and the totality of payments thus linked. The analysis is based 
on  controlled  economic  experiments  which  were  carried  out  in  two  locations:  at  the 
University of Kiel, Germany, and the University of Western Australia in Perth, Australia.
  
 
2 Previous work  
This  study  builds  on  three  strands  of  previous  work:  the  problem  of  efficiently 
allocating conservation contracts; the theory of auctioning incentive contracts; and the design 
and implementation of conservation auctions. These represent a logical progression from how 
to  get  landholders  to  provide  conservation  services  efficiently,  to  the  idea  of  tendering 
incentive contracts and finally to investigating how far this idea can be made to work for 
conservation  policy.  The  problem  of  optimally  selecting  conservation  actions  and  sites 
includes investigations by Van Teefelen and Moilanen (2008) and by Costello and Polasky 
(2004).  Casting  the  solution  of  this  problem  into  an  appropriate  analytical  economic 
framework includes work by Moxey et al. (1995) and Davis et al. (2006). This framework 
highlighted the key issue, that of moral hazard in a principal-agent relationship (Fraser, 2002; 
Hart and Latacz-Lohmann, 2005). Accordingly, the problem of how to design contracts in 
such a way  as  to  address  this  problem was  studied by authors like Moxey et  al. (1999), 
Ozanne and White (2007) and Ferraro (2008); White (2005) also analyzed the correlative 
issue of contract monitoring.  
Getting the contracted parties to provide the necessary effort to deliver the contracted 
goods to quality specifications was a problem first clearly formulated by Green in 1979. This 
problem was cast into the analytical framework of the principal-agent relationship by McAfee 
and McMillan (1986), Laffont and Martimort (2002) and Laffont and Tirole (1987, 1988). 
Leitzel and Tirole (1993) applied this framework to the procurement setting. This idea had 
also been pursued by Laffont and Tirole (1993) by combining and integrating the linking of 
contractual payments to outcomes and the auctioning of the contracts in a competitive setting; 
Branco (1995) generalized some of the results obtained by Laffont and Tirole in 1987. The 
static setting was also expanded to the dynamic setting by Laffont and Tirole (1988), with a 
follow-up by Sun Ching-jen in 2007. This work provided the theoretical bedrock on which 
applications to environmental policy could be formulated.  
The  key  problem  in  the  present  study  was  how  to  optimally  select  contracts  for 
conservation works that are to be carried out by landholders (Hajkovicz et al., 2007). Latacz-
Lohmann and Schilizzi (2005) review the literature on how ideas from auction design and 
implementation have been applied to conservation contracting, and Latacz-Lohmann and Van 
der Hamsvoort (1997) propose a specific model for doing so when budgets are constrained   4 
(which is normally the case). A number of policy implementations were reviewed, mainly in 
the USA and Australia (Reichelderfer and Boggess, 1988). Evaluation of this experience by 
Grafton (2005), Gole et al. (2005) and Connor et al. (2008) highlighted the problematic nature 
of paying landholders uniquely on actions or inputs, e.g. fencing, weeding or planting trees, 
without specific reference to the actual environmental outcomes, such as streamwater quality, 
a measure of biodiversity or the rate of soil erosion. At this juncture, the idea of tendering 
contracts to landholders and that of linking contract payments to environmental outcomes 
were brought together, linking the two previous strands of literature. This integration has now 
begun to be investigated both theoretically (Goddard et al., 2008) and practically, with The 
Australian Auction for Landscape Recovery Under Uncertainty (ALRUU) leading the way 
(White et al. 2009), and some explorations also carried out in Europe, e.g. in Germany (Groth, 
2009; Klimek et al., 2007) and Sweden (Zabel and Holm-Müller, 2008). This latter work, as 
well as that by Goldman et al., has also highlighted the importance of landholder cooperation 
in  achieving  the  contracted  environmental  outcome:  the  effects  of  individual  landholder 
actions  extend  beyond  the  boundaries  of  their  private  properties,  especially  when  mobile 
species and synergistic ecological effects are involved.  
 
3 Experimental design 
The experiments did not aim to study the effort response to performance payments per 
se, but rather whether any efficiency gains, both in terms of effort provision and in terms of 
expected environmental outcome, could be obtained by combining performance payments and 
tendering. To disentangle these two effects, it was necessary to compare the tendered and non-
tendered contracts. The non-tendered case was thus implemented primarily as a benchmark 
for the tendered case.  
In  addition,  the  level  of  environmental  outcome  is  directly  related  to  effort;  more 
specifically, it reflects total effort obtained rather than individual supply of effort. Total effort 
obtained is also a function of the participation rate: individual effort of those who have ‘opted 
in’ may be high, but if their number is small relative to those who have ‘opted out’ due to the 
participation effect, the total level of effort obtained will be small, as will the corresponding 
environmental outcome. These considerations can all be brought together and summarized as 
shown in Table 1.  
Table 1: Study of incentives involved  





performance payment effect 
1  Basic incentive 
    (effort level) 
2  = (1) × participation rate 
Auction: competition effect  
(bidding through effort level) 
3  Extra incentive over 
    and above (1) 
4  = (3) × participation rate 
             × selection rate 
 
The  performance  payment  effect  in  Table  1  is  linked  to  the  achievement  of  an 
uncertain environmental outcome; the competition effect is linked to selection by the tendering 
mechanism. Each introduces a certain degree of uncertainty. Cell (1) represents the individual 
incentive effect, for those who have ‘opted in’, of linking (at least part of) the payment to 
uncertain  environmental  outcomes.  Cell  (2)  represents  the  total  incentive  effect  of 
performance payments and is the combined effect of individual effort and participation rate. 
Cell (3) is the extra incentive, if any, over and above (1) created by putting the contracts up 
for tender. Cell (4) represents the total incentive effect when incentive contracts are tendered. 
Not only, like in (2), does it depend on the participation rate but also on the selection rate, as 
decided by the tendering authority. Table 2 gives an overview of the experimental design   5 
aimed at disentangling the various effects. The core idea underlying Table 2 is to examine 
how increasing the proportion of the uncertain performance payment relative to the sure fixed 
payment affects the supply of individual effort, and to replicate this under both non-tendered 
and tendered scenarios.  
Effort could vary between 0 and a maximum of 10 units. Whenever a non-zero fixed 
payment was offered, a minimum of three units of effort was required. Effort was costly, with 
a  linear  cost  function  of  10  ECUs  (Experimental  Currency  Units)  per  unit  of  effort. An 
‘environmental production function’ defined the probability of achieving an environmental 
‘biodiversity value’ threshold (BV) as an increasing function of effort. This probability had 
two possible values for any given level of effort: a higher and a lower value, representing, 
respectively, a favorable and an unfavorable states of nature (disease, drought,  fire, etc.), 
thereby defining a state-contingent production function (Chambers and Quiggin, 2000) (see 
Figure 1). Each of these two states was equiprobable. 











  Benchmark computed for PP = 0 
1) C150   ; min 3  150  150 
2) C200   ; min 3  100  200 
3) C300     0  300 
Tendered  
incentive contracts 
  Benchmark computed for PP = 0 
 
4) E150   ; min 3  150  150 
5) E200   ; min 3  100  200 
6) E300     0  300 
Legend:   = bidder’s decision (There was no minimum effort when no fixed payment was offered.) 
    Payment amounts in ECUs (experimental currency units) 
Figure 1: Environmental state-contingent production functions for two types of nature 
 
Since  the  results  were  likely  to  be  affected  by  risk  attitudes,  we  submitted  all 
participants with a simple lottery, which asked them to consider a lottery ticket that had a 50% 
chance of earning them $1000. They were then asked the minimum amount they were willing 
to accept to sell the ticket to the experimenter. A number below $500 was a measure of risk 
aversion, while a number above $500 was a measure of risk taking. As the results below 
suggest, the data, however crude, proved sufficient to shed some light on the role of risk 
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H P(Y>T | 1)  6 
attitudes. This was all done prior to, and independently of, the core part of the experiment, 
albeit in the same session and with the same participants.  
The experiments were carried out in two different locations, in Kiel, at the University 
of Kiel, and in Perth, at the University of Western Australia, to control for robustness of the 
results. The Kiel experiment was carried out with first-year agriculture students. Participants 
in the Perth experiment were mostly second-year students – all in the area of agriculture or 
natural resource management. The number of participants in each session varied somewhat 
but averaged 20. The resolution of the state of the environment (favorable or not) was done by 
tossing a coin at the end of a session (the two states being equiprobable). This determined for 
each participant whether they had achieved the BV threshold or not. The risk spread between 
these two states of the environment was held constant in this study. The tender type was of the 
target-constrained rather than of the budget-constrained type and selected two-thirds of the 
bidders  with  the  highest  effort  supply.  So  as  not  to  distract  from  the  main  focus  of  the 
experiments, participation costs were equal for all, and consisted of a fixed transaction cost of 
50 ECUs and a variable cost of 10 ECUs per unit effort. Initial wealth endowments, which 
were added to net gains at the end, were calibrated so as to avoid the possibility of net losses 
in real dollars for participants. Landholders’ decisions involved participating versus opting out 
and, if opting in, choosing their level of effort. The payment mix (of fixed and performance 
payments) was given in each scenario, but different scenarios varied the mix, as per Table 2. 
An overview of the experimental parameters and their values is given in Box 1. 
Box 1: Experimental parameters  
  Two locations (Kiel and Perth): to control for robustness of results 
  Number of groups (2 x 2) and group size ( 20) 
  States of nature, uncertain (0 and 1: unfavorable & favorable by ex-post coin toss) 
  Risk spread between 0 and 1: probability of achieving the BV threshold, g(x), held 
constant in this study  
  Incentive contracts: 50%, 67% and 100% PP (The 0% case was computed) 
  Tender type: target-constrained (as opposed to budget-constrained)  
  Type of bid: through supply of effort; effort could be chosen on a scale from 0 to 10 
units, with a minimum of 3 units for contracts involving a fixed payment 
  Selection (under tender): 2/3 of those who do not ‘opt out’ (freedom not to participate) 
by effort level; no selection in the non-tendered case  
  Decision variables: participation; individual effort supply  
  Policy parameters: fixed payment; performance payment 
  Participation costs: equal for all = fixed transaction cost + cost per unit effort 
  Initial wealth: 0; 50; 100 ECUs: to avoid net real final losses 
  Information given after each round: none, to simulate one-off bid only and no learning  
PP = Performance Payment, linked to achievement of outcome: it constitutes the incentive payment    
BV = Biodiversity Value threshold, which defines the achievement target  
 
4 Experimental results  
Examining the impact of performance payments on participant effort carries its own 
value in terms of research results; however, the main focus of this study was to assess the 
value of tendering the contracts and therefore also how to disentangle the two aspects when 
combined. In the non-tendered treatment, we focus on the effects of increasing the proportion 
of  performance  (i.e.  incentive)  payments  relative  to  fixed  (input)  payments,  while  in  the 
tendered  treatment,  we  focus  on  how  tendering  the  contracts  modifies  the  NT  results. 
Accordingly, we present the non-tendered treatment (henceforth NT) results separately from 
the tendered treatment (henceforth T) results.    7 
  We investigate two aspects, individual behavior and policy performance. Individual 
behavior focuses on 1) the individual effort supplied by participants (NT treatment) or bidders 
(T  treatment);  2)  the  participation  rate  (or  whether  subjects  choose  to  opt  out  and  not 
participate); and 3) the impact of risk attitudes on effort provision and participation. Policy 
performance  is  measured  by  1)  the  total  effort  obtained,  which  directly  determines  the 
expected environmental outcome; and 2) ‘value for money’ in the form of budgetary cost-
effectiveness, whether in terms of dollar outlay per unit of total effort or per unit of expected 
outcome obtained.  
 
4.1   Individual behavior: effort and participation 
4.1.1   Non-tendered treatment (NT): impact of increasing performance payments 
Supply of individual effort. Hypothesis: the supply of individual effort increases with 
the proportion of the total payment, kept constant, that is linked to the environmental outcome 
(henceforth %PP). Experimental results confirm this on average and consistently across all 
four subject groups (Figure 3): effort doubles when moving from the 0%PP to the 50%PP 
scenario. In 0%PP, the total payment is made up front, requiring only the minimum of 3 effort 
units. However, this is true only up to a point. As Figure 4 shows, at fairly moderate rates of 
%PP (around 50% in our case), individual effort levels off and remains constant in spite of 
further increases in %PP. This result adds new information to the theoretical analysis, since it 
was not predicted by it. One reason why this is happening might be that participants’ risk 
aversion to uncertain payments ends up outweighing the incentive effect. Is this the case?  
Figure 3: Individual effort offered as a function of the share of payment linked to 
outcome  






0% 50% 67% 100%
% of payment linked to outcome
 
 
Effect of risk attitudes on supply of effort. Hypothesis: all other things held equal, a 
higher degree of risk aversion should increase optimal effort. Our experimental results vary 
somewhat  from  this  prediction,  as Table  4  shows.  Read  vertically  (to  keep  the  treatment 
parameter constant), risk attitudes appear to have no effect on the supply of individual effort 
whatsoever, except at the highest %PP level, when, indeed, risk-averse individuals do increase 
their supply of effort. To understand this discrepancy, we need to know what happens to the 
participation rate which, we may recall, reflects participants’ individual rationality constraint.  
Participation rate. Hypothesis as %PP increases, participation should fall. This prediction is 
borne out by our results, on average and consistently across all four experimental groups 
(Figure 4).  In our experiments participation started dropping at  around 67% PP, but only 
became substantial at 100% PP, where the participation rate fell to 60%. For the remaining 
subjects the risk of a net loss was not worth the minimal effort required for receiving the fixed 
payment; they decide to ‘opt out’ and not sign a contract.    8 









RA  5.9  5.9  7.2 
RN  5.7  5.6  5.8 
RP  6.1  5.8  5.9 
Legend: RA = risk averse; RN = risk neutral; RP = risk prone 








0% 50% 67% 100%
% of payment linked to outcome
 
 
4.1.2   Tendered treatment (T): impact of tendering the contracts 
Supply of individual effort. Hypothesis: tendering increases the supply of individual 
effort of those who have decided to put in a bid. Indeed, tendering adds a second layer of 
uncertainty,  that  of  not  being  selected,  over  and  above  the  risk  of  not  achieving  the  BV 
threshold. A higher level of effort thus reduces the risk of not being selected as well as that of 
not achieving the threshold.  
This extra individual effort obtained by tendering is visible over the whole range of 
performance payments, from 0%PP to 100%PP (Figure 5a). However, as Figure 5b shows, a 
second-order effect also emerged from our experiments: consistently across all four groups, 
the rate at which tendering extracts additional effort falls as %PP rises
1. For non-incentive 
0%PP contracts, tendering extracts about 50% more effort, but this figure drops to 20% for 
50%PP and further to 15% for 100%PP. This is a result that theoretical analysis was not 
powerful enough to predict. If the transaction costs of organizing and running a tender are 
taken into account, then a compromise must again be struck between performance payments 
and tendering the contracts. From Figure 5a, it is clear that, on average, tendering does extract 
more effort, but there is no advantage in increasing %PP beyond 50%. Thus, what was true in 
the NT case remains true under tender.  
Participation rate. Theory suggests that tendering should not modify the participation rates 
obtained in the non-tendered case. Figure 6 shows however this not to be entirely true, at least 
for high values of %PP. Although  the 1% lower participation rate  at  the 67%PP level  is 
negligible, the 7% average drop at the 100%PP level, from 59% to 53%, is significant and 
consistent across all four experimental groups. This drop in participation may be related to 
two possible causes, though these are only hypotheses at this stage. One is the extra mental 
loading of having to also include the uncertainty of being selected, a form of transaction cost. 
The other is the possible role of ambiguity aversion, as opposed to risk aversion, in Ellsberg’s 
sense: total uncertainty is greater under the combined tender and incentive scheme than in the 
NT case alone. 
                                                 
1 A negative logarithmic function fits the aggregate data well (R
2=90%), where dE = – 0.26 Ln(%PP) + 0.47.  
However, when looking at individual bids, the data is much noisier.      9 
Figures 5a,b: Impact of tendering on individual effort offered 
Individual effort put in: Non-T vs Tender
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Figure 6: Impact of tendering on participation rates  
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4.2  Policy performance: environmental outcomes and cost-effectiveness 
4.2.1 Non-tendered (NT) treatment 
Total  effort  and  expected  outcome.  Total  effort  results  from  the  combination  of 
individual effort and participation (Table 1, cell 2). Since increases in %PP were shown to 
increase effort but reduce participation, it is not surprising that total effort exhibits an inverse 
U curve, as per Figure 7a. There thus exists an optimum level of %PP. In our experiments, it 
ranged between 50%PP and 67%PP. Since total effort also determines expected outcome, as 
per Figure 1, this result extends to expected level of environmental outcome.  
Cost-effectiveness. Defining cost-effectiveness by the payment outlay per unit of total 
effort, the story changes: in this case, the higher the %PP, the lower the payout per unit of 
effort,  and  so  the  higher  the  cost-effectiveness,  as  shown  in  Figure  7b.  From  a  policy 
perspective, when deciding what %PP rate is best, one must make trade-offs between the two 
objectives of outcome level and cost-effectiveness.  
4.2.2  Tendered (T) treatment  
Total effort and outcome obtained. Participation rates and individual supply of effort 
combine with the selection rate (see cell 4 in Table 3) to yield total effort obtained, and so too 
the expected level of environmental outcome. Here, one needs to distinguish between two 
aspects,  a  theoretical  and  a  pragmatic  one.  For  the  NT  and  T  scenarios  to  be  directly 
comparable, one must apply the same selection ratio to both. In practice, however, the NT 
setup will accept all participants whereas in T a selection criterion will apply. Figures 8a and 
8b  present  the  theoretical  comparison  and  Figures  8c  and  8d  present  the  pragmatic  one, 
assuming a tendering selection ratio of 2/3 of bidders.    10 
Figure 7a,b: Total effort and budgetary cost-effectiveness as a function of the share of 
payment linked to outcome (averages across all four groups)  
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Figures 8a,b: Impact of tendering on total effort obtained with identical selection ratios 
Total effort obtainable: (2/3) NT vs T
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Figures 8c,d: Impact of tendering on total effort obtained with a 2/3 selection ratio only 
in tender  
Total effort obtained: Non-T vs Tender
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Figures 8a and 8c show that tendering does not modify the pattern observed in the NT 
case,  namely,  that  there  exists  an  optimal  %PP,  between  50%  and  67%,  which  yields 
maximum effort and outcome. However, the incremental second-order effects from tendering 
now depend on one’s perspective. If one artificially neutralizes the policy-dependent selection 
ratio by applying the same ratio to both NT and T scenarios, the result, as shown in Figure 8b, 
appears similar to the individual effort case of Figure 5b, but with different increments. In 
both  cases,  the  advantage  of  tendering  the  contracts  falls  rapidly  as  payments  linked  to 
uncertain outcomes are introduced (see decrease between 0%PP and 50%PP).  
From the pragmatic point of view, NT and T setups will always differ by the fact that a 
selection criterion operates in the latter but not in the former. A selection criterion of 2/3 of 
bidders is a reasonable ratio and close to what has been often chosen by policy-makers using 
conservation tenders (e.g. BushTender in Australia). The incremental effects of the tender now 
appear different to those observed in Figures 5b and 8b: as Figure 8d shows, not only does the 
increment  in  total  effort  fall  very  rapidly  with  the  rate  of  performance  payments,  but  it 
actually goes negative before even reaching 50%PP. That is, tendering the contracts with a 2/3 
selection ratio actually reduces the expected level of environmental outcome.  Of course, the 
difference between Figures 8b and 8d will be smaller if the selection criterion is greater than   11 
2/3 and tends towards 1 and greater if it is less than 2/3 and tends towards 0. Thus in practice, 
tendering and incentive payments counter-act each other in terms of total effort and expected 
outcome, reflecting the opposite forces of incentive provision and risk bearing. With too much 
risk, as is the case when cumulating outcome and selection uncertainty, the risk effect ends up 
outweighing  the  incentive  effect.  Our  experiments  consistently  showed  that  this  happens 
rather early on the incentive scale; that is, before 50%PP is reached.  
Cost-effectiveness. If we now change perspective and focus on ‘value for money’, or 
budgetary cost-effectiveness, the picture again changes, in a similar way it did in the NT 
scenario. Figure 9a shows that the higher the %PP, the better the cost-effectiveness; that is, the 
smaller the budgetary outlay per unit of total effort or expected environmental outcome. The 
marginal  value  of  running  a  tender  is  however  greatest  in  cost-effectiveness  terms  for 
contracts with only moderate payments linked to outcomes (50%PP), as Figure 9b suggests.   
Figures 8a,b: Impact of tendering on total and marginal cost-effectiveness 
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5 Conclusions  
Based on a general theoretical analysis, controlled laboratory experiments were carried 
out with four different groups of university students in two countries to investigate the effects 
of  tendering  incentive  contracts  on  effort  supplied  and  participation,  as  well  as  their 
implications in terms of expected environmental outcome and budgetary cost-effectiveness.  
Experimental  results  for  the  non-tendered  contracts  confirmed  the  theoretical 
predictions, but also added new insights in the form of second-order effects. As the proportion 
of  the  outcome-linked  payment  increases  at  the  expense  of  the  fixed  payment,  the  total 
expected payment remaining constant, the participation rate falls, and the supply of individual 
effort increases, but only up to a point, after which it levels off. This results in a trade-off 
between maximizing the expected level of environmental outcome and maximizing budgetary 
cost-effectiveness.  Maximizing  environmental  outcome  requires  one  to  limit  incentive 
payments to moderate levels, whereas cost-effectiveness is maximized when 100% of the 
payment is outcome-based.  
Taking the previous results as benchmarks, tendering contracts which are subject to 
varying rates of performance payments has the following impacts: with only a slight fall in 
participation  at  high  rates  of  performance  payments,  it  further  increases  the  supply  of 
individual  effort,  but  at  a  decreasing  rate  as  the  proportion  of  performance  payments 
increases.  It  thus  further  exacerbates  the  trade-off  between  maximizing  environmental 
outcome  and  maximizing  cost-effectiveness.  Except  for  very  low  rates  of  performance 
payments, when most of the payment is made up front, and taking into account the policy-
determined selection ratio, tendering actually reduces the expected level of environmental 
outcome. However, tendering raises even further the cost-effectiveness of the scheme for all 
values of performance payments; but the marginal value of the tender peaks at moderate 
performance payment rates of around 50%.   
The foregoing results carry clear implications for the design of conservation contracts 
when  both  tendering  and  performance  payments  are  available  as  options.  Based  on  our   12 
theoretical analysis, confirmed but also qualified by our experimental results, we can derive 
the following implications from the policy maker’s perspective:  
Implication 1: The provision of individual effort is maximized by tendering contracts with 
payments only moderately linked to outcomes.  
Implication 2: For maximizing the expected level of environmental outcome, contracts should 
not be tendered but payments should be made partially dependent on achieving outcomes. 
Implication  3:  If  value  for  money  (budgetary  cost-effectiveness)  is  to  be  maximized, 
payments should be totally dependent on outcomes and contracts should be tendered.  
To the above three propositions, we can add this fourth one:  
Implication 4: For a purely risk-averse population, the main difference with the more general 
results above is that it is always preferable to put the contracts up for tender.  
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